Network Games under Strategic Complementarities

We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network effects are large. Action may not be aligned with network centrality and the interdependence between agents' actions may be broken.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012-10
Authors:	Belhaj, Mohamed ; Bramoullé, Yann ; Deroian, Frédéric
Subject:	Network Games \| Strategic Complementarities \| Supermodular Games \| Bonacich Centrality

More details

Series:	AMSE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 1225 15 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010900277