Network Games under Strategic Complementarities

We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network effects are large. Action may not be aligned with network centrality and the interdependence between agents' actions may be broken.

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Year of publication:	2012-10
Authors:	Belhaj, Mohamed ; Bramoullé, Yann ; Deroïan, Frédéric
Institutions:	HAL
Subject:	Network Games \| Strategic Complementarities \| Supermodular Games \| Bonacich Centrality

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00793439
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933839