Networks with group counterproposals

Ricardo Nieva

We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency. -- Efficiency ; Bargaining Protocol ; Counterproposals ; Network Formation ; Transfers ; Externalities ; Groups ; Coalitions

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Nieva, Ricardo
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Subject:	Unternehmensnetzwerk \| Business network \| Theorie \| Theory \| Soziales Netzwerk \| Social network \| Netzwerk \| Network \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 14 S., 269,33 KB)
Series:	Working paper. - Milan : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2217241-5. - Vol. 61.2008
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/53302 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008780592