Networks with Group Counterproposals

We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Nieva, Ricardo
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Soziales Netzwerk \| Social network \| Unternehmensnetzwerk \| Business network \| Netzwerk \| Network \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (18 p)
Series:	FEEM Working Paper ; No. 61.2008
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 2008 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1259656 [DOI]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215253