A widespread belief considers decentralization of collective bargaining as a key element in introducing relevant innovations and changes in the work organization. In relation to this belief, since 2011 the Italian collective bargaining system is being specifically monitored by European institutions urging for “further reform [of] the collective wage bargaining system allowing firm-level agreements to tailor wages and working conditions to firms' specific needs”. In spite of the scepticism concerning the new European macroeconomic governance judicial constraints, it is undeniable that this new set of regulations, procedures and institutions induced a favourable climate for non-regulatory interventions in this field as an acceptable and possible exit strategy from the economic crisis. Nevertheless, in Italy, this climate has not yet modified the collective bargaining structure that, as of today, remains strongly centralized. This framework has not changed, even though in these years hard and soft policies have been implemented in order to alter the hierarchical two-tier system of bargaining. To this end, the article aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the collective bargaining trends in Italy, using data from the INAPP-RIL survey conducted on a sample of approximately 22,000 Italian firms. In the first part, we analyse data from 2005 to 2015, focusing on multi-employer and single-employer bargaining, with particular regard to employer association membership. In the second one, we investigate the single-employer bargaining in 2015, breaking down data with reference to business size, economic sector and geographical area. Data confirm that in Italy, as in other countries, the dominant level of bargaining seems to be a matter of agreement and not of law. The paper shows that the share of firms applying a multi-employer collective agreement increased from 2010 to 2015, while at the same time the employer association membership decreased. In these years the share of firms declaring the application of firm-level agreements did not increase and the second level of bargaining remains strongly related to firms' dimension and economic sector. Furthermore, firm-level agreements are mostly used to regulate productivity-related pay and “soft” issues (e.g. corporate welfare and work-life balance) still continue to be negligible
