New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation
Year of publication: |
March 2017
|
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Authors: | Mizukami, Hideki ; Wakayama, Takuma |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 152.2017, p. 76-78
|
Subject: | Secure implementation | Nash implementation | Dominant strategy implementation | Restricted monotonicity | School choice | The deferred acceptance algorithm | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | USA | United States | Theorie | Theory |
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