Extent: | Online-Ressource (XXVI, 811 p. 156 illus., 1 illus. in color, digital) |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Bibliografie |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Description based upon print version of record New Perspectiveson Industrial Organization; Preface; Contents; List of Figures; Part I: Introductory and Review Material; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1.1 The Origins and Methods of Industrial Organization; 1.1.1 Early Theoretical Foundations; 1.1.2 Institutional and Empirical Traditions; 1.1.3 The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm; 1.1.4 Competing Paradigms and Public Policy; 1.1.5 Game Theory and the New Theoretical Industrial Organization; 1.1.6 New Empirical Industrial Organization; 1.2 Behavioral Economics and Industrial Organization; 1.3 Public Policy and Industrial Organization 1.4 Economic Theory, Models, and Mathematics1.4.1 Theory, Models, and Reality; 1.4.2 Modeling and Mathematics; 1.5 Approach of the Book; 1.6 Summary; Chapter 2: Demand, Technology, and the Theory of the Firm; 2.1 The Short Run and the Long Run; 2.2 Consumer Theory and Demand; 2.2.1 The Introductory Model of Consumer Choice; 2.2.2 Market Demand; 2.2.3 Demand Elasticities; 2.2.4 Total Revenue, Marginal Revenue, Average Revenue, and Price Elasticity; 2.2.5 Nonfunctional Demand and Behavioral Economics; 2.3 Technology and Costs; 2.4 The Theory of the Firm; 2.4.1 Firm Motives 2.4.2 The Boundaries of the Firm2.5 Summary; 2.6 Review Questions; Appendix A: A Review of Present Value and Discounting; Chapter 3: Introductory Game Theory and Economic Information; 3.1 Describing a Game; 3.2 Static Games of Complete Information; 3.2.1 Fundamental Types of Static Games; 3.2.2 Static Game Equilibria; 3.2.2.1 Dominant-Strategy and Iterated Dominant-Strategy Equilibria; 3.2.2.2 The Nash Equilibrium; 3.3 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information; 3.3.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information; 3.3.1.1 Sequential Rationality and Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium 3.3.1.2 Classic Examples and Experimental Evidence3.4 Repeated Games; 3.5 Bargaining and Fair Allocations; 3.6 Games with Incomplete, Asymmetric, and Imperfect Information; 3.7 Concluding Remarks; 3.8 Summary; 3.9 Review Questions; Chapter 4: Behavioral Economics; 4.1 Why Do We Make Mistakes?; 4.1.1 Complexity, Information, and Bounded Rationality; 4.1.2 Of Two Minds: The Dual Systems Approach; 4.2 Salience; 4.3 Framing Effects; 4.3.1 Framing Effects and False Beliefs; 4.3.2 Anchoring; 4.3.3 Default Effects; 4.4 If It Makes You Happy; 4.4.1 Overconfidence; 4.4.2 Confirmation Bias 4.4.3 Cognitive Dissonance4.5 Choice Under Risk and Uncertainty; 4.5.1 Reference Dependence; 4.5.2 Endowment Effects, Loss Aversion, and the Status Quo; 4.5.3 Uncertainty and Signals of Quality; 4.6 Time-Inconsistent Preferences; 4.6.1 Discounting; 4.6.2 Neuroeconomics and Self Control; 4.6.3 Impulsivity; 4.6.4 Addiction and Cues; 4.7 Who Are You? Economics and Identity; 4.8 Summary; 4.9 Review Questions; Part II: Perfect Competition, Monopoly, Product Differentiation, and Market Structure; Chapter 5: Perfect Competition and Market Imperfections*; 5.1 The Assumptions of Perfect Competition 5.2 Firm Behavior in Perfect Competition |
ISBN: | 978-1-4614-3241-8 ; 978-1-4614-3240-1 |
Other identifiers: | 10.1007/978-1-4614-3241-8 [DOI] |
Classification: | Wettbewerb |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014016020