New prospects in social choice theory: median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking

The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can fulfill requirements of an ideal democracy. We then work out an original voting function obtained by hydrizing Borda Majority Count (mean-based) and Majority Judgment (median-based). The so-called “Mean-Median Compromise Method” slices between mean and average values. It proposes, moreover, a new tiebreaking method computing intermedian grades mean.

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Year of publication:	2014-09-15
Authors:	Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. ; Savadogo, Zoïnabo ; Ulungu, Berthold E.-L.

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. and Savadogo, Zoïnabo and Ulungu, Berthold E.-L. (2014): New prospects in social choice theory: median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking. Published in: Advanced Studies in Contemporary Mathematics , Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 2015): pp. 19-38.
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; I31 - General Welfare; Basic Needs; Quality of Life
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015247506