No information sharing in oligopoly: The case of price competition with cost uncertainty

We show that concealing cost information is a dominant strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies. This result enables us to endogenize the number of firms in a market in terms of market size, entry costs, and unit cost uncertainty.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Hornig, Stephan ; Stadler, Manfred
Institutions:	Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen
Subject:	Produktionskosten \| Oligopol \| Reaktionsverbundenheit

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 194
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009151414