Non-Audit Services and Auditor Independence : Client Performance

In 2014, the EU adopted a bill limiting the non-audit services of auditors, reflecting societal concern that non-audit services provided by auditors can compromise auditor independence. But different from the expectation that the provision of non-audit services by external auditors affects auditor independence, previous studies have shown inconsistent results. What could be the reason? Contracts for non-audit services start from the purchase motive of the company with a need for non-audit services (Firth, 1997; Parkash and Venable, 1993). Simunic (1984) argued that only abnormal companies with special problems purchase non-audit services. However, not all non-audit services sales compromise auditor independence. This study analyzed and illustrated whether the purchase of non-audit services affects auditor independence by the examining the interaction between the performance of audit clients with earnings management incentives and the quasi-rents of the auditor. The results show that the discretionary accruals of corporations with poor management performance increased with statistical significance when they purchased non-audit services from an external auditor. However, among companies with excellent management results, no statistical significance between the purchase of non-audit services and discretionary accruals was identified. Thus, to analyze the effects of non-audit services on auditor independence, researchers should consider the purchase motives of audit clients asking for non-audit services