Non-Walrasian decentralization of the core

We show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this exercise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that in some approximate sense individual attempts to manipulate the decentralizing prices cannot be beneficial, which fits precisely the interpretation of asymptotic core convergence, namely the emergence of price taking.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Koutsougeras, Leonidas C. ; Ziros, Nicholas
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 47.2011, 4-5, p. 610-616
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Core \| Nash equilibrium \| Asymptotic proximity \| Decentralization

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010875265