Non-welfare economics and the well-being of phantom agents: an appeal to caution

Besley (1988) is one of the few exceptional articles containing non-welfarist optimal tax devices. Feehan(1990) reports an error in his first-best rules. The present note criticizes the fundamentals of Besley's second-best rules. These rules optimize the welfare or well-being of phantom agents rather than the corrected welfare of real existing agents in society.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Capéau, Bart ; Ooghe, Erwin
Institutions:	Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Public Economics Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in abbreviated form under the title "Merit goods and phantom agents" in Economics Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 8, pp. 1-5. 13 pages longpp.
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005770844