Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games.
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mailath, G.J. ; Samuelson, L. ; Swinkels, J.M. |
Institutions: | Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems |
Subject: | game theory | information | economic models |
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