North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Caparrós, Alejandro ; Pereau, Jean-Christophe ; Tazdaït, Tarik
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Klimaschutz \| Umweltabkommen \| Verhandlungen \| Nord-Süd-Beziehungen \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Asymmetrische Information \| Theorie \| Welt \| Bargaining theory \| asymmetric information \| climate change \| international cooperation

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Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 9.2003
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/118035 [Handle] RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.09 [RePEc]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325037