note: A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power

Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the "strong" type of the informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when the issues are perfectly substitutable.

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Year of publication:	2000-02-15
Authors:	Bac, Mehmet
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 29.2000, 1, p. 119-126
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Alternating offers bargaining \| incomplete information \| sequential equilibrium \| delay

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: July 1996/Final version: August 1999
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755765