Note On linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games

In the framework of values for TU-games, it is shown that a particular type of consistency, called linear consistency, together with some kind of standardness for two-person games, imply efficiency, anonymity, linearity, as well as uniqueness of the value. Among others, this uniform treatment generalizes Sobolev's axiomatization of the Shapley value.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2002-05-27
Authors:	Driessen, Theo ; Yanovskaya, Elena
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 30.2002, 4, p. 601-609
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Cooperative TU-game \| value \| consistency \| reduced game

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375581