NOTES - Uncertainty in Executive Compensation and Capital Investment: A Panel Study The CEO's degree of uncertainty about the CEO's future compensation has a statistically significant negative effect on the firm's level of capital investment. Regularly updated pay-for-performance contracts are therefore likely to exert a greater influence on CEO behavior and the realted agency costs than one-time ...
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | Chakraborty, Atreya ; Kazarosian, Mark ; Trahan, Emerya A. |
Published in: |
Financial management. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0046-3892, ZDB-ID 1860343. - Vol. 28.1999, 4, p. 126-139
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