Object allocation via deferred-acceptance : strategy-proofness and comparative statics
Year of publication: |
May 2016
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Authors: | Ehlers, Lars H. ; Klaus, Bettina |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 97.2016, p. 128-146
|
Subject: | Indivisible objects allocation | Deferred-acceptance-algorithm | Strategy-proofness | Resource-monotonicity | Population-monotonicity | Allokation | Allocation | Unteilbare Güter | Indivisible goods | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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