Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information

I consider settings with rich private information—an agent's type may include private information other than just his preferences. In such settings, I identify a necessary condition for obviously strategy-proof implementation of social choice rules. I consider applications to strict preferences, matching and object allocation

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Halushka, Mariya
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 23, 2021 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3833137 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D90 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231140