ocial Status and the Overworked Consumer
A policy restricting working hours may be justified if agents care about their social status, as the race for status induces them to work too much. We show that this intuition is questionable if the commitment capacity of the government is limited: status seeking does press people to supply excessive labor relative to the social optimum, yet the time consistent policy of a government controlling working hours implies a shortage of hours.
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | CAHUC, Pierre ; POSTEL-VINAY, Fabien |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 2005, 78, p. 143-161
|
Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Temporary Jobs, Employ Protection and Labor Market Performance
Postel-Vinay, Fabien, (2001)
-
Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence
Cahuc, Pierre, (2006)
-
Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence
Cahuc, Pierre, (2006)
- More ...