Offices and Policies : Why Do Oppositional Parties Form Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Authoritarian Regimes?

This paper investigates the occurrence of oppositional pre-electoral coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes. Using a unique database of 115 elections in 57 countries, during the period 1989-2004, the paper argues that oppositional parties' potential for policy - as well as office - gains affects the willingness to form coalitions. In this way coalition behaviour under authoritarianism is similar to the same process in consolidated democracy. However, the lack of a clear policy dimension in many electoral authoritarian regimes, and the fact that the electoral arena is tilted in favour of the incumbent regime, makes oppositional coalitions rare in this context. The article show the first statistical evidence that coalitions are more probable when an oppositional victory seems realistic. When incumbent economic performance is poor and when elections are preceded by political liberalization, coalitions are more likely to be formed. Similarly, by utilizing unique data on party policy preferences, the study shows that ideologically coherent oppositional parties with distinctive policy differences compared to the incumbent government are more likely to coordinate their campaigns