On bargaining sets for finite economies

We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result, this Edgeworth bargaining set shrinks to the set of Walrasian allocations.

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Year of publication:	2014-07-18
Authors:	Hervés-Estévez, Javier ; Moreno-García, Emma

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Hervés-Estévez, Javier and Moreno-García, Emma (2014): On bargaining sets for finite economies.
Classification:	D00 - Microeconomics. General ; D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015246417