On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games

We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (Stuart, 1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Atay, Ata ; Solymosi, Tamás
Publisher:	Budapest : Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Subject:	Bargaining set \| core \| matching market \| assignment game \| cooperative game

More details

Series:	IEHAS Discussion Papers ; MT-DP - 2018/5
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1666701157 [GVK] hdl:10419/222018 [Handle] RePEc:has:discpr:1805 [RePEc]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290252