On core stability and extendability

This paper investigates conditions under which the core of a TU cooperative game is stable. In particular the author extends the idea of extendability to find new conditions under which the core is stable. It is also shown that these new conditions are not necessary for core stability.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Shellshear, Evan
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Subject:	Kooperatives Spiel \| Theorie \| Core stability \| Stable core \| Extendability

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Series:	Working Papers ; 387
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	572384475 [GVK] hdl:10419/43790 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272576