On delegation under relational contracts

Oliver Gürtler

In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It is found that the principal is less likely to delegate both tasks in a dynamic setting than in a static one (where formal contracts are the only feasible incentive device), as handling one task herself enables a much wider use of relational contracts.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Gürtler, Oliver
Publisher:	Mannheim [u.a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject:	Job design \| relational contracts \| formal contracts \| delegation \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Unvollständiger Vertrag \| Incomplete contract \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Kooperative Führung \| Participative leadership \| Arbeitsvertrag \| Labour contract \| Lieferantenmanagement \| Supplier relationship management

Extent:	Online-Ressource ([1], 30 S.)
Series:	Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. - Bonn : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2499250-1. - Vol. 113
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/94085 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; L23 - Organization of Production ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010365874