On Efficiency, Tie Breaking Rules and Role Assignment Procedures in Evolutionary Bargaining

We study a simple evolutionary bargaining game and show that the efficiency of bargaining behavior can depend crucially on the tie breaking rule players use. In fact, in a certain limit all the surplus is wasted. Inefficiency arises for any role assignment procedure, as long as there is some probability that two players are assigned to the same role. We also give results on the relationship between inefficiency and spitefulness.

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Year of publication:	2003-11-01
Authors:	Poulsen, Anders
Institutions:	Nationalökonomisk Institut, Institut for Økonomi
Subject:	Game theory Bargaining \| Two-stage Nash Demand Game \| Efficiency \| Evolutionary stability \| Tie-breaking role assignment \| Truly asymmetric contest

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Working Papers Number 03-9 9 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005424109