On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests

It is argued in this paper that the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is an adequate analysis tool for contest theory. Moreover, it is shown that in a contest ESS always differs from Nash equilibrium, the hitherto dominant solution concept in contest theory. Finally, an interpretation of finite population ESS contest behavior in terms of Nash behavior is supplied. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Leininger, Wolfgang
Published in:	Economics of Governance. - Springer. - Vol. 4.2003, 3, p. 177-186
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Conflict theory \| contest \| evolutionarily stable behavior \| appropriation \| expropriation

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005391124