On Finitely Repeated Games and Pseudo-Nash Equilibria

In this paper we propose a pseudo-Nash equilibrium for N-person games in which very simply we allow play in the last period to be arbitrary, but otherwise it must conform to the (perfect) Nash optimality criterion.

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Year of publication:	1985-10
Authors:	Chou, Chien fu ; Geanakoplos, John
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Pseudo-Nash equilibrium \| arbitrary last period play \| overlapping generations economies \| Radner's definition \| "crazy equilibrium"

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The price is None Number 777 28 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762608