On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
Year of publication: |
2003-05-16
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ruth Mart?ez ; Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es ; Neme, Alejandro ; Oviedo, Jorge |
Institutions: | Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
Subject: | Matching | stability | strategy-proofness |
Extent: | application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | 4 pages long |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
Source: |
-
Robust stability in matching markets
Kojima, Fuhito, (2011)
-
Robust stability in matching markets
Kojima, Fuhito, (2011)
-
Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
Kojima, Fuhito, (2013)
- More ...
-
On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles
Martínez, Ruth, (2009)
-
AN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE SET OF MANY-TO-MANY STABLE MATCHINGS.
Ruth Mart?ez,
-
Voting by Committees under Constraints
Salvador BARBER?, (2001)
- More ...