On Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect

We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an ex post incentive-compatibility constraint which says the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterize optimal separating joint liability contracts incorporating this constraint.[...]

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Year of publication:	2005-10-01
Authors:	Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis ; Ghatak, Maitreesh ; Lensink, Robert
Institutions:	India Development Foundation ; London School of Economics and Political Science ; Rijksuniversiteit <Groningen>
Subject:	Vergleich \| Vertrag \| Sortieren \| sorting \| Gemeinsam aktiv \| CORPORATE \| Verbindlichkeiten \| commitment

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Extent:	133120 bytes 18 p. application/pdf
Series:	London School of Economics and Political Science - Published Papers
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	Theory of organisation ; Capital budgeting, budgetary planning and budgetary control ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008911469