On Knots and Dynamics in Games.

We extend Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) structure theorem concerning the Nash equilibrium correspondence to show that its graph is not only homomorphic to the underlying space of games but that it is also unknotted. This is then shown to have some basic consequences for dynamics whose rest points are Nash equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	DeMichelis, S. ; Germano, F.
Institutions:	Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

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Series:	Tel Aviv.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	13 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647215