On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cvitanić, Jakša ; Henderson, Vicky ; Lazrak, Ali |
Published in: |
Mathematics and financial economics. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1862-9679, ZDB-ID 2389728-4. - Vol. 8.2014, 4, p. 453-471
|
Subject: | Compensation | Incentives | Hedging | Specific and Systematic risk | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Risiko | Risk | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Anreiz | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktienoption | Stock option | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
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