On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Cvitanić, Jakša ; Henderson, Vicky ; Lazrak, Ali |
| Published in: |
Mathematics and financial economics. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1862-9679, ZDB-ID 2389728-4. - Vol. 8.2014, 4, p. 453-471
|
| Subject: | Compensation | Incentives | Hedging | Specific and Systematic risk | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Risiko | Risk | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Anreiz | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktienoption | Stock option | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
-
Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value
Armstrong, Christopher, (2012)
-
Equity incentives, disclosure quality, and stock liquidity risk
Wruck, Karen H., (2017)
-
Risk-taking incentives and risk-talking outcomes
Mishra, Dev R, (2024)
- More ...
-
Cvitanić, Jakša, (2006)
-
Option pricing, interest rates and risk management
Jouini, Elyès, (2001)
-
Optimal trading under constraints
Cvitanić, Jakša, (1997)
- More ...