On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort equilibria developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] and suggests an alternative equilibrium characterization.

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Year of publication:	2006-11
Authors:	Attar, Andrea ; Chassagnon, Arnold
Institutions:	HAL
Subject:	non-exclusivity \| insurance \| moral hazard

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00589101
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751017