On multiple agent models of moral hazard

In multiple principal, multiple agent models of moral hazard, we provide conditions under which the outcomes of equilibria in direct mechanisms are preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. We discuss the role of random allocations and recommendations and relate the result to the existing literature.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Attar, Andrea ; Campioni, Eloisa ; Piaser, Gwenaël ; Rajan, Uday
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia
Subject:	Moral Hazard \| Multiple Agents \| Direct Mechanism

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2006_32 22 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005030057