On pure strategy equilibria in large generalized games

We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions are continuous and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players. When atomic players have convex sets of admissible strategies and quasi-concave objective functions, a pure strategy Nash equilibria always exists.

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Year of publication:	2013-03
Authors:	Riascos Villegas, Alvaro ; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Generalized games \| Non-convexities \| Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107769