On Revenue and Welfare Dominance of Ad Valorem Taxes in Two-Sided Markets

A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009-09-15
Authors:	Kind, Hans Jarle ; Koethenbuerger, Marko ; Schjelderup, Guttorm
Institutions:	Institutt for foretaksøkonomi, Norges Handelshøyskole (NHH)
Subject:	Ad Valorem Taxes \| Unit Taxes \| Two-Sided Markets \| Revenue-Dominance \| Welfare-Dominance \| Monopoly

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Discussion Papers Number 2009/9 8 pages
Classification:	D40 - Market Structure and Pricing. General ; H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General ; L10 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577783