On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests

Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply the result to the battle of sexes between males and females over the raising of offspring.

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Year of publication:	1995
Authors:	Bhaskar, V.
Institutions:	Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Subject:	Game Theory \| game theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series CentER Discussion Paper Number 1995-30
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091518