On the design of piece-rate contracts
We characterize the optimal piece-rate contract in the canonical moral hazard setting with a wealth-constrained, risk averse agent. The contract is shown to have a simple, intuitive characterization in a structured, but broad, class of settings.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bose, Arup ; Pal, Debashis ; Sappington, David E.M. |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 107.2010, 3, p. 330-332
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Moral hazard Piece-rate contracts |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Bose, Arup, (2012)
-
Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams
Bose, Arup, (2010)
-
Bose, Arup, (2011)
- More ...