On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games

Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2. Copyright Springer 2006

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Berden, Caroline ; Peters, Hans
Published in:	Theory and Decision. - Springer. - Vol. 60.2006, 4, p. 359-370
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	bimatrix games \| coordination games \| risk aversion

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710994