On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Cardona-Coll, Daniel ; Rubí-Barceló, Antoni |
Published in: |
Public choice. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0048-5829, ZDB-ID 207597-0. - Vol. 161.2014, 3/4, p. 345-366
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Subject: | Legislative bargaining | Quota rules | Public good | Pork barrel | Pareto efficiency | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Pareto-Optimum | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Gesetzgebung | Legislation | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Effizienz | Efficiency | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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