On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games

We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We consider spaces of distributional and behavioral strategies, and highlight the relationship between their respective topologies, which implies that the two spaces are mutually interchangeable throughout the analysis. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.

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Year of publication:	2014-05-18
Authors:	Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol ; McLean, Richard
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick
Subject:	Bayesian games \| discontinuous game \| distributional strategy \| behavioral strategy \| payoff security

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Series:	Departmental Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	20 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010797420