On the incentive effects of sample size in monitoring agents : a theoretical and experimental analysis
Year of publication: |
Feburary 2017
|
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Authors: | Avrahami, Judith ; Güth, Werner ; Kareev, Yaakov ; Uske, Tobias |
Published in: |
German economic review. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1465-6485, ZDB-ID 1481108-X. - Vol. 18.2017, 1, p. 81-98
|
Subject: | Monitoring | tournament | incentives | uncertainty | stochastic production technology | Theorie | Theory | Experiment | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Anreiz | Incentives | Risiko | Risk | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation |
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