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On the Interpretation of two Theoretical Models of Bargaining.

Year of publication:
1992
Authors: Rubinstein, A.
Institutions: Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University
Subject: game theory | economic equilibrium | contracts | economic models
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Series:
Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Notes:
18 pages
Source:
RePEc - Research Papers in Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646850
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