On the Interpretation of two Theoretical Models of Bargaining.
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Rubinstein, A. |
Institutions: | Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University |
Subject: | game theory | economic equilibrium | contracts | economic models |
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