On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation

This note uses a three-stage delegation-licensing-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Wang, X. Henry ; Hsu, Judy
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 12.2004, 6, p. 1-10
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	licensing strategic delegation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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