On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives
By extending manipulability indices defined for single-valued social choice rules to the multi-valued case, we explore the degree of manipulability of seven multi-valued social choice rules. Our analysis is based on computational experiments.
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Aleskerov, Fuad ; Karabekyan, Daniel ; Sanver, M. Remzi ; Yakuba, Vyacheslav |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 64.2012, 1, p. 67-73
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
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