On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
Year of publication: |
2001-12-24
|
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Authors: | VIEILLE, Nicolas ; ROSENBERG, Dinah ; SOLAN, Eilon |
Institutions: | HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) |
Subject: | Stochastic games | partial monitoring | value |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Les Cahiers de Recherche - Groupe HEC Number 760 20 pages |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: |
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