On the (Non) Existence of a Price Equilibrium in Delegation Games with Relative Performance Compensation

We show that Miller and Pazgal's (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to those affecting the stability of price cartels

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Kopel, Michael
Other Persons:	Lambertini, Luca (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
Series:	Quaderni DSE Working Paper ; No. 807
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 16, 2012 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1988115 [DOI]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013112159