On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be approximated by equal-treatment Îµ-cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we rely on a fixed point theorem.

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Year of publication:	2014-11-03
Authors:	Eden, Benjamin
Institutions:	Vanderbilt University Department of Economics
Subject:	NTU games \| core \| approximate cores \| small group effectiveness \| coalition formation \| payoff dependent balancedness

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213817