On the Number of Contestants and Equilibrium Individual Effort

This paper shows that in a contest with the "Tullock" forms of contest success function, an increase in the number of contestants always reduces individual effort. However, when the outcome of the contest is governed by a noisy function of effort, then individual effort could either increase or decrease following an increase in the number of contestants, depending on whether the density function of the shock is upward or downward sloping.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Peng, Baochun
Published in:	Topics in Theoretical Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 6.2006, 1, p. 1305-1305
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press
Subject:	contest success function \| effort

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	oai:bepress:bejte-1305
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005751190