On the operation of multiple matching markets
Year of publication: |
November 2016
|
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Authors: | Anno, Hidekazu ; Kurino, Morimitsu |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 100.2016, p. 166-185
|
Subject: | Market design | Strategy-proofness | Second-best incentive compatibility | Top trading cycles rules | Deferred acceptance rules | Matching | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Unteilbare Güter | Indivisible goods | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism |
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